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Abstract
Effectively assessing and configuring security controls to minimize network risks requires human judgment. Little is
known about what factors network professionals perceive to make judgments of network risk. The purpose of this
research was to examine first, what factors are important to network risk judgments (Study 1) and second, how
risky/safe each factor is judged (Study 2) by a sample of network professionals. In Study 1, a complete list of factors
was generated using a focus group method and validated on a broader sample using a survey method with network
professionals. Factors detailing the adversary and organizational network readiness were rated highly important. Study
2 investigated the level of riskiness for each factor that is described in a vignette-based factor scenario. The vignette
provided context that was missing in Study 1. The highest riskiness ratings were of factors detailing the adversary and
the lowest riskiness ratings detailed the organizational network readiness. A significant relationships existed in Study 2
between the level of agreement on each factor’s rating across our sample of network professionals and the riskiness
level each factor was judged. Factors detailing the adversary were highly agreed upon while factors detailing the
organizational capability were less agreed upon. Computational risk models and network risk metrics ask professionals
to perceive factors and judge overall network risk levels but no published research exists on what factors are important
for network risk judgments. These empirical findings address this gap and factors used in models and metrics could
be compared to factors generated herein. Future research and implications are discussed at the close of this paper.
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Introduction
An information system is a discrete set of information
resources organized expressly for the collection, process-
ing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposi-
tion of information [1]. All information systems, which we
use interchangeably with the term networks, have inher-
ent network-related risks that cannot be eliminated com-
pletely because of operational resource constraints. Risks,
defined as “the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse
or unwelcome circumstance” [2], must then be prioritized
based on the relative risk level and addressed accord-
ing to the feasibility of mitigation strategies given both
context and resource constraints. Network professionals
must evaluate risk throughout the network lifecycle but
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we focus on risk evaluation during network design and
control configuration.
Within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and civil-
ian government networks, organizations must undergo
a network certification process— i.e., ISO27000 series
(information security standards published jointly by the
International Organization for Standardization, ISO, and
the International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC) and
NIST 800 series [3])—to evaluate network risk. This
process of certification involves a designated approving
authority (DAA) who engages with the organization’s
information assurance (IA) officer to determine the orga-
nization’s network risk level, based on risks identified and
control configurations established to address those risks.
Some risks are reduced, but not eliminated, through the
implementation of various security controls—i.e., man-
agement, operational, and technical safeguards or coun-
termeasures employed within an information system to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
system and its information (a listing of such controls is
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found in [1]). Ultimately at the end of the certification
process, the DAA certifies that the network, with certain
controls implemented, meets an acceptable standardized
level of network risk.
This network risk certification process, which requires
the perception and judgment of network risk, is difficult to
standardize across network professionals because in part,
different people believe that different factors are impor-
tant to judgments of risk ([4,5]). A factor is a perceived
circumstance, event, influence, fact, etc. that is related to
a particular outcome. Both risk perception and judgment
can be influenced by network context ([6,7]), which we
operationally define as perceivable factors physically and
temporally surrounding an event or circumstance (e.g.,
the organizational policies, the types of adversaries target-
ing that organization, the types of adversaries, etc.). With
respect to judgments of network risk, little is known about
what factors are consistently important and unimportant
to network professionals like the DAA and IA officers.
Guidelines included in network risk metrics for assessing
and assigning risk levels are often generic and not tailored
to the conditions and contexts of a given network. Con-
sequently during the decision process, individuals like the
DAA may have to ignore certain network attributes not
covered in the guidelines or ignore the guidelines alto-
gether. Under circumstances where guidelines cannot be
clearly applied, the DAA most likely relies on his/her own
perceptual capabilities, work experiences, etc. to judge the
network risk level, yet little prior research has investigated
exactly what factors are actually being considered. Using a
mixed-method approach [8] that combines qualitative and
quantitative researchmethods to achieve study objectives,
we attempted to identify and validate the factors people
believe are most important to network risk judgments.
The challenges with judging network risk levels are due
in part to the semantic complexity of the term itself.
Underlying this semantic complexity is the lack of an
agreed upon definition of risk from professionals in indus-
try and academia ([6,9]). Consequently, risk miscommu-
nications may arise [6] because interlocutors may have
different semantic meanings of the term, risk. Risk is a
psychological construct [10], an idea constructed in the
human mind from the aggregation of dimensions or cat-
egories of abstract or tangible perceived phenomenon.
The dimensions constituting network risk that we are
familiar with include likelihood, vulnerability, resilience,
impact, etc. but it is not clear whether network profes-
sionals all believe the same dimensions comprise network
risk. Dimensions can be derived from perceived factors
that include environmental information, past experiences,
and other psychological phenomena such as attitudes and
belief systems [6]. For example, a “likelihood” dimension
of the network risk construct might be driven by perceived
environmental factors and historical experience factors
indicating the “likelihood” of successful implementation
of security controls prior to an attack. The risk research
literature provides varying definitions of risk or perceived
risk across different domains (e.g., [11-14]) but no consen-
sus exists about the dimensions underlying risk in general
or factors used to construct these dimensions ([6,15-21]).
We conjecture that a relationship exists between how
network risk is defined, what underlying dimensions are
important to a network risk definition, and the relevant
dimensional factors used in judgments of network risk.
Investigating these dimensions and relevant factors might
offer clues to how network risk is defined by network pro-
fessionals. To our knowledge, no foundational research
exists that documents the network risk dimensions and
respective factors important to network professionals who
design and secure networks. This is the impetus for our
research.
We used an exploratory, mixed-method approach to
identify what factors are important and unimportant for
risk judgment in general (Study 1) and what factors are
commonly and most consistently judged as more safe or
more risky (Study 2) across our sample of network profes-
sionals. Because no prior research has identified network
risk dimensions important to risk judgments in the con-
text of a network, Study 2 was designed to address this.
Prior research indicates that risk perception and judgment
can be influenced by context ([6,7]). Therefore, we were
interested in identifying robust dimensions and respective
factors that are not susceptible to the effects of different
contexts.
This paper is structured to review each study’s objective,
the method, the results and conclusions. We close this
paper with an overall discussion that includes the implica-
tions of our findings, the limitations of our research and
future directions.
Study 1: factors that impact network risk
perception
Study purpose and research overview
The purpose of Study 1 was (a) to generate a comprehen-
sive list of perceived factors that were relevant to judg-
ments of network risk and (b) to determine which factors
were considered most and least important to judgments
of network risk. A focus group of cybersecurity profes-
sionals first generated a list of relevant factors, which were
then validated with a broader sample of cybersecurity and
network professionals using an online survey method.
Method
Participants
Focus Group Demographics. Five cybersecurity profes-
sionals plus one moderator comprised the focus group.
All focus group members were employees at a single
organization with a variety of cybersecurity expertise.
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The self-reported expertise included acquisition support
(1 participant), cyber threat and vulnerability analysis (1
participant), cyber enterprise and workforce management
(1 participant), and enterprise threat/vulnerability man-
agement (2 participants). No other demographic informa-
tion of this sample is permitted to be disclosed.
Survey Sampling and Demographics. The target popula-
tion included cybersecurity and/or network professionals,
who either designed, implemented, supported, and/or
tested networks for security purposes or who trained
individuals to do these functions. We used a snowball
sampling technique [22], first soliciting colleagues at our
institution for study participation; they subsequently
invited others inside and outside our organization. The
mean sample age (n = 38) was 47 years with a standard
deviation (SD) of 10.3 years. The mean number of years
worked in computer science professions was 13 (SD = 9.7),
and the mean number of years in their current job was
9 (SD = 7.7). We did not require participants to report
additional demographic information on the DHS sectors
supported. Consequently, we had low response rates for
this question and did not report on these questions.
Materials and procedure
Focus Group. During three sequential two-hour meetings
spread over the course of a week, we conducted a mod-
erated focus group using a brainstorming and consensus
building technique [23] to identify all factors (at any gran-
ularity of detail) that impact network risk perception. We
did not collect related information about why each fac-
tor was important, or why some factors had very specific
language; we were just generating a comprehensive list.
Focus group discussions about “why” a factor was pro-
vided often lead to desultory discussions and long debates
about the validity of the factor so we discouraged those
discussions. Each factor offered by each group member
was then recorded on a single Post-it Note™ and organized
taxonomically by the focus group on butcher paper using
an affinity diagramming technique [24].
Online Survey. All factors generated in the focus group
sessions, regardless of their granularity, were placed in an
online survey to assess their validity on a broader sample
of network professionals. The purpose of the online sur-
vey was to assess the consensus on the importance level
of each factor. The survey was hosted by SurveyGizmo™,
a browser-based survey design and deployment tool, and
it comprised three survey subsections: informed consent,
factor ratings, and demographics.
Informed consent was obtained in accordance with
ethics guidelines for research with human subjects (Insti-
tutional Review Board approval HS12-571). After provid-
ing consent, participants read the online instructions and
then rated each of the factors, presented in random order,
one factor per survey page. Each factor was presented in
a standardized sentence structure, bolded for quick iden-
tification (e.g., “Generally, how important is <factor> to
your overall perception of network risk?”); no additional
network information or context was provided. Partici-
pants were asked to adjust a slider to reflect a level of
importance on a continuum between 0 (not at all impor-
tant) and 100 (extremely important). If a participant could
not understand the meaning of the factor or had no expe-
rience with it, this person was instructed to refrain from
making a rating and to write “don’t know” in a comments
box below the factor. After rating all presented factors,
participants could suggest additional factors.
Participants then answered demographics questions
about (a) job title, (b) job-related expertise, current
employer(s), (c) whether their current job supported the
US government, military, private industry or whether
he/she was a private consultant, and (d) which of the
18 DHS ISAC sector(s) he or she supports (e.g., health-
care, banking, energy). The order of the demographics
questions was not randomized. Survey participants were
financially compensated with a $15 gift card at the close
of the survey.
Results
This section first discusses common distributions of rat-
ings for each factor and then compares the factor means.
All factors identified by the focus group and used in the
online survey are listed in Additional file 1: Table SA-1, for
quick reference.
Participants did not typically use the response scales
consistently (e.g., some use the entire range of the
response scale while others use a small portion) so we
characterized these first. The mean importance ratings
obtained from our 38 survey participants ranged from
38.8 to 83.5 on the 0 to 100-point scale. Three com-
mon distributions of factor ratings (for Factors 8, 5, and
51) are shown in Figure 1: unimodal, bimodal and mul-
timodal. Factor 51 (The maturity of the organization’s
system capabilities for network defense), an example uni-
modal distribution, has a high level of agreement with
most ratings clustered at the high level, indicating that
this factor is very important to most participants. Factor
8 (whether the facility uses “SCADA” supervisory control
and data acquisition systems) has a bimodal response dis-
tribution because scores were clustered around the low
or less important end of the scale and around the high
or more important end of the scale. Scores for Factor 5
(whether the network is for the military, government, or
civilian sector) are distributed across the range of impor-
tance ratings. The Additional file 1: Table SA-2 lists all
factors, rank-ordered in descending order according to
mean importance ratings, and provides density plots of
the rating distributions of each factor. Inspection of all
density plots for each factor indicates that 27 factors have
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Figure 1 Representative density plots of importance ratings for three factors. Note: The y-axis is the density of responses, and the-x axis is the
importance ratings given by participants. Each rating provided by a single participant is represented by a circle along the x-axis, and the curve is the
estimated density or probability distribution of ratings for the population (Study 1).
roughly unimodal distributions, 16 factors have roughly
bimodal distributions, and the remaining 26 factors have
multimodal distributions.
Table 1 provides five factors with the highest mean
importance ratings and five factors with the lowest mean
importance ratings. The highest rated factors detailed the
adversary capabilities and the complexity of the organi-
zation’s network defense. For example, the factor with
the highest mean importance rating was the adversary’s
knowledge about the organization’s deployed network and
security technologies (Factor 18, rank = 1). Other highly-
rated factors include the skill of the adversary (Factor 31,
rank= 3), how desirable the information on the network is
to the adversary (Factor 63, rank = 6), whether the adver-
sary has access to information needed to stage an attack
(Factor 28, rank= 11), and whether the attack is persistent
or casual (Factor 2, rank = 23).
The standard deviations (SDs) of the importance ratings
(also shown in Additional file 1: Table SA-2) were com-
puted to assess agreement across participants. Table 2
shows the five factors with the least inter-subject agreement
(highest SDs) and the five with the most inter-subject
agreement (lowest SDs). By comparing Tables 1 and 2, we
note that three of the five factors with the most inter-
subject agreement (Factors 18, 45, and 51) were also
deemed to be among the most important factors. We
assessed whether a relationship existed between the level of
importance of each factor (mean importance rating) and
the agreement (SDs) and no linear relationship was found.
To determine whether dimensions emerged from our
data, we used an affinity diagramming method to hierar-
chically classify the factors generated by the focus group.
Three broad categories or dimensions emerged and were
named by the research staff after reviewing each the
underlying factors of each dimension (see Figure 2): (1)
organization hosting the network, (2) threat/adversary,
and (3) contractors (prime contractor, sub-contractors).
Specific factors mapped to these dimensions were iden-
tified in Additional file 1: Table SA-1. An exploratory
analysis revealed that of the ten highest-ranked factors,
only one was associated with contractors (Factor 1), four
were related to the adversary/threat (Factors 7, 18, 31, and
63), and five were associated with the organization (three
of these five organizational factors are related to the net-
work environment—Factors 23, 51, and 66). Also, of the
ten factors with the lowest rankings, none were associated
with the adversary/threat; five were associated with con-
tractors and five with the organization (the low-ranking
organizational factors are related to programmatic, policy,
and workforce factors—none are associated with network
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Table 1 The five least important and fivemost important factors rated across participants (Study 1, n= 38)
Factor # Mean SD Factor description
Least Important 30 38.8 29.5 The perceived organizational allegiance (purchases predominantly domestic
brands of hardware/software versus purchases foreign brands)
39 39.6 32.2 Different methods of paying the contractor (e.g., fixed price versus cost plus)
to your perception of risk? Fixed price: Payment is a flat fee thatmustmeet pre-
determined list of requirements. Cost plus: Payment is not flat fee, but it scales
over time to cover unforeseen costs of meeting predetermined requirements.
49 40.6 30.5 The presence or absence of an organization’s fear-driven responsiveness to
threat
44 41.8 30.5 The open- or closed-source protection technology used by your organization
25 42.0 30.9 The recertification cycle (e.g., short versus long) as a constraint effecting the
ability to secure the organization’s network before an attack
Most Important 66 79.9 21.4 The complexity of the organization’s systems and/or networks that makes it
easy or difficult to secure
45 80.5 13.7 The organization’s response to threats (proactively planned for an attack
versus reactively responded to an attack)
31 80.8 23.3 The level of skill the adversary has (e.g., professional or amateur)
51 81.1 14.3 The maturity of the organization’s system capabilities for network defense
18 83.5 17.4 The adversary’s knowledge (e.g., high versus low knowledge) about the orga-
nization’s deployed network and security technology
environment). Thus, factors associated with the adver-
sary/threat and those associated with the organization’s
network environment appeared to be ranked high in
importance; factors associated with contractors tend to be
ranked lower in importance, as do other general organiza-
tional factors unrelated to the network environment. This
is shown in Figure 3, which was generated to assess the
relationship between dimensions and risk judgments. The
bar chart in Figure 3 displays the percentages of factors in
each of the three dimensions that were rated as high (top
1/3), medium (middle 1/3) and low (bottom 1/3) impor-
tance. The organization dimension was populated by the
highest number of factors compared to the other two
dimensions. Thematrix in Figure 3 breaks down counts by
dimension and level of importance. The highest rated fac-
tors (14) andmost of the lowest rated factors (13) involved
the organization. To assess whether there was a significant
association between factor dimension and level of impor-
tance, a chi square test of association was conducted and
found to be non-significant (χ2(4) = 8.99, p = 0.06).
Participants were asked whether any important factors
needed to be added to our list and these were suggested:
• Does the organization support “doing the right thing”
when the situation warrants?
• Morale of the IT, security, and general staff?
Table 2 Factors with the five highest and five lowest standard deviations of importance ratings (Study 1, n= 38)
Factor # SD Mean Factor
High SDs (Low Agreement) 8 34.0 48.3 Whether the facility uses SCADA systems
5 32.4 53.3 Whether the network is for the military, government, or civilian sector
39 32.2 39.6 The different methods of paying the contractor (e.g., fixed price versus cost plus)
to your perception of risk?
21 31.6 59.6 The information types that make up the network contents of your organization
34 31.5 45.5 The ease (e.g., low versus high ease) of finding U.S.-born personnel instead of
foreign-national personnel to fill network security positions within the organiza-
tion
Low SDs (High Agreement) 45 13.7 80.5 The organization’s response to threats (proactively planning for an attack versus
reactively responding to an attack)
51 14.3 81.1 The maturity of system capabilities for network defense
18 17.4 83.5 The adversary’s (level of) knowledge (e.g., high versus low) about the organiza-
tion’s deployed network and security technology
11 19.3 78.8 Whether the organization has a disaster recovery plan
12 19.3 70.7 The past performance of the organization’s hired contractor
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Figure 2 Taxonomy developed based on focus group contributions. Study 1; not all details shown due to space limitations.
• Access to historical intrusion/failure data
• Commitment to IT hygiene
• The presence or absence of a solid knowledge
management system.
Discussion
A focus group of network security professionals generated
a comprehensive list of factors considered relevant to net-
work risk perception. Our survey results indicated that
factors relating to the adversary or to the complexity of
the organization’s network defense were considered most
important. We assessed whether a relationship existed
between the level of importance (importance ratings) and
the level of agreement SDs) amongst our sample partici-
pants. While a statistically significant linear relationship
between SDs and mean ratings of all factors did not
exist, the five most agreed-upon factors (lowest SDs) were
also judged as relatively more important [mean ratings
between 70.7 and 80.5]. Three emergent dimensions of
factors were found (organization, adversary and contrac-
tors) in the absence of context.
The importance of each of our 69 factors was assessed
but we could not ascertain whether each factor was safe
or risky or whether context changes the emergent dimen-
sions of factors. This became the impetus for the second
study.
Study 2: context and network risk perception
Study purpose and research overview
We used a subset of factors from our original list of 69
factors and analyzed the degree of riskiness or safeness of
each. Given the lack of contextual information related to
each factor in Study 1, our subset of factors was analyzed




The target population comprised network professionals
versed in the practices of cybersecurity. As shown in
Table 3, the 105 participants who completed the sur-
vey represented a variety of software engineering, IT
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Figure 3 Relationship between factor dimensions and importance ratings. Percentages of factors in three factor dimensions that ranked in the
top, middle, and bottom third in overall importance (Study 1).
management, and information security occupations. The
overall mean number of years spent in the computer sci-
ence professions was 9.6 (SD = 7.6) with a range between
1 and 36 years. We did require participants to report
additional demographic information on the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) critical infrastructure sec-
tors supported. The top five DHS sectors participants
self-reported to support were Information technology
(62), Academia (21), Communications (18), Banking &
Finance (17), and Public health (11). Five supported
the military, 15 supported the government and 11 were
contractors.
Materials and procedures
Three vignettes were generated to represent different net-
work contexts: Vignette 1 described a hospital network,
Vignette 2 described a military network, and Vignette
3 described a software development firm network. The
context of each vignette differed on attributes like the
history of the network and adversarial activity, how the
network is manned, the type of information stored on that
network and how the network is controlled and config-
ured. Immediately after the participant read the vignette,
he/she rated the overall network risk level using a slider
(0 = low risk and 100 = high risk) and then offered a
ranking (low, medium, or high network risk) according to
the NIST SP800-30 guidance [3]. Then, ratings on indi-
vidual factors were solicited. Originally, we designed the
vignettes to depict factors using a few descriptive sen-
tences to depict each factor, but in our survey beta testing,
respondents believed that the factors were not the ones
we originally intended. Instead, participants believed the
main idea of each descriptive sentence was a single factor.
Therefore, we obtained ratings for each sentence’s main
idea using a bipolar response scale between 0 = extremely
safe and 100 = extremely risky. A rating of 50 was labeled
neither safe nor risky.
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Table 3 Frequencies of categories of self-reported job titles (Study 2, n=105)
Job category Definition Examples Number of participants
Analyst Analyst is a programmer, developer, Applications security analyst, IT specialist, 34
implementer or other person who network systems specialist
provides solutions to customer problems.
Architect Architect is a designer who develops Network security architect, network architect 7
system specifications and balances
system-wide tradeoffs.
Engineer Engineer is a senior developer with Network engineer, information security 30
some design expertise. engineer,
Manager Manager is responsible for allocating Program manager, risk manager, sr. IT 12
resources to projects and meeting manager
schedules.
Director Director oversees a department or company. Directory of engineering, director of 11
research, director of IT, CSO
Other “Other” includes students and non-IT- Student, recreation assistant 11
related positions.
SurveyGizmo™ hosted the online survey, which was
divided into three sections: informed consent, vignette
scenarios, and demographics (job title, the DHS criti-
cal infrastructure sectors supported, whether the person
was working for the government, military, academia or
in training). Informed consent was obtained in accor-
dance with ethics guidelines for research with human
subjects (Institutional Review Board approval HS12-571).
After providing informed consent, each participant was
randomly assigned to one of three vignettes using the
survey randomizing tool. Each participant reviewed only
one vignette. After reviewing a vignette and providing
ratings, participants answered a set of un-randomized
demographic questions and were awarded a $20 compen-
satory Amazon gift card.
Results
Exploratory data analysis of overall risk ratings and rankings
Figure 4 summarizes the vignette risk ratings and risk
rankings. In the boxplot on the left, the x-axis represents
the vignette number (1 = hospital network, 2 = military
and 3 = software development firm) and the y-axis repre-
sents the risk ratings. The stacked bar chart on the right
shows, for each of the vignettes on the x-axis, the fre-
quency of participants that ranked the risk as either low,
medium or high. As shown in the boxplot on the left,
Vignette 2 had the highest mean risk rating denoted by
the horizontal bar in the middle of the box; but the mean
ratings were not significantly different. Though partici-
pants believed Vignettes 1 and 3 were relatively less risky,
the stacked bar chart on the right of Figure 4 indicates
Figure 4 Risk ratings and rankings for the three vignettes. Note: The left boxplot has ratings on the y-axis and vignette on the x-axis. The
stacked bar chart displays counts on the y-axis and vignette on the x-axis. The number of participants who read each vignette varied, as indicated by
the labels on the bars (Study 2, n = 105).
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that participants did not rank any of the vignettes as
predominantly low-risk.
Factor grouping by risk impact
One of the goals of Study 2 was to determine which
factors, described by certain contextual features, were per-
ceived as risky or safe. We used Bonferroni corrected
t-tests to identify factors affecting on risky/safe ratings
(i.e., tests conducted against the null hypothesis that pop-
ulation risky/safe means were 50). Those factors with a
corrected p-value above 0.05 were removed from fur-
ther consideration. We then divided the remaining factors
(those with mean ratings significantly different from 50)
into four groups based on their median scores: VERY
SAFE (median rating below 30) includes factors such as
Machines are not connected to both the private net-
work and the internet; SOMEWHAT SAFE (median rat-
ing between 30 and 45) includes factors such as The IT
staff are fully trained; SOMEWHAT RISKY (median rat-
ing between 55 and 72) includes factors such as All patient
records are digitized; and VERY RISKY (median rating
above 72) includes factors such as Hackers in the past
few weeks have been attacking various medical centers
nationwide. The factors with the median ratings between
46 and 54 were not included in Table 4 because they
were not significantly different from 50. Table 4 lists the
factors in each of these groups, along with their median
and mean risk scores, SDs, and vignettes to which they
belong.
Table 5 displays the most agreed upon factors (lowest
SDs) with respect to the risky/safe ratings and the least
agreed upon (highest SDs). The values of SDs for these
85 factors, across all three dimensions, ranged from 10.2
to 24.4 (median = 18.05). To assess whether a relation-
ship existed between the number of high vs. low standard
deviations and the risky/safe ratings for those factors,
we compared the risk levels assigned to factors that
exhibited SDs below the median (high agreement among
respondents) with those that exhibited SDs above the
median (low agreement across respondents). For risk lev-
els, we used the same categories shown above for Table 4:
Safe (Rating < 45), Neutral (45 < Rating < 55), Risky
(55 < Rating). Table 6 provides the 2 × 3 matrix of
high/low agreement by safe/neutral/risky importance rat-
ings. The resultant significant chi-square test of associa-
tion (χ2(2) = 7.06, p = 0.029, n = 85) indicated that our
study participants agreed more about factors that were
judged as riskier, compared to those that relate to lower
network risk.
Factor groupings based on correlation
One way to summarize the ratings data for each sin-
gle vignette is to group the ratings into clusters of
factors that vary together across participants. Then,
determine whether an underlying conceptual or seman-
tic commonality exists amongst a group of factors
that cluster; likened to a principal components analy-
sis used with larger sample sizes. If commonalities exist,
they may provide clues about ‘agreed upon’ underly-
ing parameters or dimensions related to network risk
judgments.
For each vignette independently, we computed the cor-
relation matrix between all the factors (all pair-wise
correlations). We used [ 1 − correlation] as a distance
measure and performed hierarchical clustering with the
Ward agglomeration method to divide the factors into
groups that might be interpreted as dimensions of the per-
ceived risk construct. We chose the number of clusters, k,
for each scenario based on examining several heuristics.
Other choices of k could be equally valid.
The resultant correlation matrices revealed clus-
ters of factors for Vignettes 1 and 2 with relatively
strong correlations within the group and low correla-
tions between factors in different groups. Because no
such relationships were observed in Vignette 3, it was
not included in further analyses. While the groupings
reflect statistical structure in the data, that structure
does not always correspond to a semantic representa-
tion of single dimensions. When the majority of the
constituent factors in a group shared a common seman-
tic interpretation, we adopted this semantic interpreta-
tion as a label for a network risk construct dimension.
Four labeled dimensions across the two vignettes
emerged:
(a) Information factors related to the information stored
on the network and the consequences of the
information being compromised — inferred from
Vignette 1 (hospital network)
(b) Infrastructure factors related to the infrastructure of
the network and the compliance of the network with
established protocols.)—inferred from Vignette 1
(hospital network)
(c) Personnel Skill factors related to the skill and
training of network personnel — inferred from
Vignette 2 (military network)
(d) Adversary Skill factors related to the skill, resources,
and motivation of the adversary — inferred from
Vignette 2 (military network).
Table 7 lists the factors (with associated mean risk rat-
ings and SDs) in each of these emergent dimensions. Also
shown in Table 7 (last column) is the risky/safe grouping
(VS = Very Safe, SS = Somewhat Safe, SR = Some-
what Risky, and VR = Very Risky) to which the factor
belongs (if any). We note that of the four dimensions of
the perceived risk construct, the adversary skill dimen-
sion contains the highest percentage of risky (SR or VR)
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Table 4 Factors organized by risky/safe ratings (Study 2)
Vignette Median risk Mean risk SD Factor
Very safe (Median risk rating <30)
1 26.0 30.0 15.2 The hospital recently installed additional emergency electrical generators.
1 28.5 31.9 18.4 A disaster recovery plan has been implemented.
1 24.5 24.2 18.5 Machines are not connected to both the private network and the internet.
1 29.0 32.1 19.0 Results of the audit meet or exceed best practices for network configuration andmaintenance.
1 25.0 32.8 20.8 The recovery effort from a natural disaster is expected to be rapid.
2 25.0 26.0 20.8 The network is a self-contained, segregated, and air-gapped network.
2 30.0 34.6 20.9 The IT staff man the network 24/7.
3 25.0 27.1 13.4 The networks are fully manned with very little employee turnover.
3 30.0 30.7 17.7 IT staff is highly trained in their area of expertise via outside training firms and local universities.
3 24.0 24.7 18.0 The chief strategy officer (CSO) has put in place a dedicated controlsmanagement teamwhose
job is tomake sure that the security controls implemented are themost effective ones possible
whether or not they are required for compliance.
3 29.5 29.0 19.8 The CSO is passionate about security.
Somewhat safe (Median risk rating between 30 and 45)
1 32.0 30.7 16.6 The personnel manning facilities are competent.
1 33.5 31.1 17.1 The IT department is adequately staffed.
1 42.0 36.5 18.0 IT had a yearly audit due to HIPAA requirements.
1 34.5 35.8 19.4 All digitized records are stored and processed on a private network.
2 35.0 36.7 15.9 An audit was recently passed.
2 35.0 35.1 18.4 The network is in full compliance with the DoD.
2 34.0 36.4 20.4 The IT staff are fully trained.
3 35.5 33.9 17.5 85% of these employees have been employees of the company for 15 years or more.
Somewhat risky (Median risk rating between 55 and 72)
1 56.0 58.0 11.6 The recent legislation on the reformation of the national health care system
1 58.5 62.6 14.0 Various adversarial organizations have growing concerns over the lack of medical record
privacy because of the legislation.
1 69.5 69.8 15.9 The type of data the hospital handles
1 65.5 64.6 16.2 All patient records are digitized.
1 70.0 66.8 16.6 End users have Windows machines.
1 65.0 68.2 17.3 It (the network) involves a large hospital.
1 59.5 63.1 17.4 The hacker’s intent was to motivate another reformation of the national health care system.
2 70.0 68.5 20.2 The network is within a small geographical region near a war zone.
2 65.0 67.1 22.1 The network is heterogeneous with Windows, UNIX, and proprietary military operating
systems.
3 68.5 66.5 10.2 The organization has 20 offices worldwide.
3 56.0 61.3 13.9 The software development firm has 13,000 employees.
3 70.0 71.5 14.1 Competition is fierce in the business intelligence domain.
3 60.0 63.8 14.2 Offices are located in North America, South America, Asia, Europe, and Australia.
3 72.0 73.8 14.9 It took a couple of years to recover from these two incidents.
3 70.0 74.2 17.8 Clients are from the government military and commercial sectors of 135 countries.
3 71.0 69.9 18.9 The intranet hosts a database of technical reports, proprietary design information, social
collaboration tools, email servers, etc.
Cowley et al. Security Informatics  (2015) 4:1 Page 11 of 16
Table 4 Factors organized by risky/safe ratings (Study 2) (Continued)
Very risky (Median risk rating >72)
1 76.0 74.9 18.1 A prolonged outage of digital recordkeeping could cause significant damage to the hospital’s
ability to serve its patients.
1 82.5 78.6 18.5 Release of patient care information puts the hospital in legal liability.
1 75.0 72.9 18.8 Hackers in the past few weeks have been attacking various medical centers nationwide.
1 74.5 73.2 19.1 These attacks in the past few weeks have leaked private patient care information on the
internet.
1 75.0 74.4 20.0 These adversarial organizations are persistent and academically capable of executing an attack.
1 77.5 75.9 22.5 Release of patient care information damages the hospital’s reputation.
1 75.0 70.6 24.0 Release of patient care information violates HIPAA regulations.
2 95.0 92.6 10.2 The primary adversary has excellent offensive cyber skills equal to or better than 90 existing
nation states.
2 90.0 87.5 12.1 The primary adversary is well funded.
2 100.0 92.2 12.1 Malicious activity has been noted on the network in the past six months since wartime
operations intensified in this region.
2 95.0 88.8 13.9 The adversary was likely trained by the U.S. government in the past two years.
2 95.0 87.7 14.8 The adversary is highly motivated.
2 90.0 86.2 14.9 The adversary is deeply interested in U.S. troop positioning.
2 80.0 78.8 16.4 The network has Windows systems.
2 85.0 83.1 16.9 The primary adversary is a nation state.
2 90.0 84.3 17.1 The network stores highly sensitive data related to enemy versus U.S. troop positioning and
high-value target location information.
2 80.0 77.0 17.3 This network stores and processes time-sensitive intelligence information.
2 87.0 80.4 18.8 The information stored and processed on this network includes Top Secret SEI 5 Eyes NOFORN
information.
2 77.0 69.9 24.1 This involves a classified military network.
3 77.5 82.5 12.6 Competitors have sophisticated well-funded espionage teams to steal competitive informa-
tion.
3 75.0 77.9 14.8 Almost all employee machines have access to both the internet and intranet.
factors (90%), while the infrastructure dimension contains
the highest percentage of safe (VS or SS) factors (60%).
Conclusion
As in Study 1, there tended to be higher agreement on the
most risky factors. For example, of the 13 factors with the
most agreement in ratings (lowest SDs), nine were judged
as risky while two were rated neutral and one was rated
safe. On the other hand, for the 16 least agreed upon fac-
tors (high SDs), no discernable differences were observed
in risky/safe ratings. Moreover, factors that were associ-
ated with the adversary/threat tended to be rated as more
risky in general. Of the 13 factors with the most agree-
ment in ratings (lowest SDs), six involved descriptions of
the adversary (five were rated as very risky and one was
rated as somewhat risky). Factors relating to the organi-
zation’s network infrastructure tended to be associated
with lower risk as well. The semantic groupings, or dimen-
sions, derived from inter-factor correlations have similar
trending as discussed in the preceding paragraph. Of the
four emergent network risk dimensions (i.e., information,
infrastructure, personnel skill and adversary skill), the
highest proportion of themost risky factors comprised the
adversary skill dimension (90%) while the highest propor-
tion of the most safe factors comprise the infrastructure
dimension (60%). Somewhat safe factors often comprise
the personnel skill and infrastructure dimensions and
somewhat risky factors span all four dimensions.
Overall discussion
Study 1 initially used a focus group method to produce
a list of possible factors believed to influence network
risk judgments and then used an online survey method to
investigate the importance of these factors with a broader
sample of network professionals. Study 1 did not ask par-
ticipants how risky each factor was, just the level of impor-
tance. Study 2 extended the Study 1 findings by asking
network professionals to review one of three vignettes and
judge how risky or safe each factor was in the vignette. We
understood that network risk judgments are difficult to
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Table 5 Lowest 15 and highest 15 standard deviations of factor importance ratings (Study 2)
SD Vignette Median risk Mean risk Factor
Low SDs (High Agreement)
10.2 2 95.0 92.6 The primary adversary has excellent offensive cyber skills equal to or better than 90 existing
nation states.
10.2 3 68.5 66.5 The organization has 20 offices worldwide.
10.3 1 50.0 50.7 These adversarial organizations are not financially well funded.
10.9 1 50.0 45.2 Database is Linux based for large-scale processing and storage.
11.6 1 56.0 58.0 The recent legislation on the reformation of the national health care system.
12.1 2 90.0 87.5 The primary adversary is well funded.
12.1 2 100.0 92.2 Malicious activity has been noted on the network in the past six months since wartime
operations intensified in this region.
12.6 3 77.5 82.5 Competitors have sophisticated well-funded espionage teams to steal competitive informa-
tion.
13.4 3 25.0 27.1 The networks are fully manned with very little employee turnover.
13.9 2 95.0 88.8 The adversary was likely trained by the U.S. government in the past two years.
13.9 3 56.0 61.3 The software development firm has 13,000 employees.
14.0 1 58.5 62.6 Various adversarial organizations have growing concerns over the lack of medical record
privacy because of the legislation.
14.1 3 70.0 71.5 Competition is fierce in the business intelligence domain.
14.2 3 60.0 63.8 The offices are located in North America, South America, Asia, Europe, and Australia.
14.4 1 50.0 48.2 Neither department has reported adversarial activity in the past that demonstrate a knowledge
of the IT infrastructure.
High SDs (LowAgreement)
20.9 2 30.0 34.6 The IT staff man the network 24/7.
20.9 3 36.5 38.1 These employees are divided into small, highly specialized teams working on one aspect of
the network e.g., LDAP server teams, router teams.
21.4 1 50.0 45.4 Records are transferred from one hospital to another manually.
21.4 2 58.0 59.6 The network has various UNIX systems.
21.9 3 50.0 50.6 No targeted attacks in the past few years. Only non-targeted email scams
22.0 1 45.0 40.3 Recordkeeping could convert back to paper.
22.1 2 65.0 67.1 The network is heterogeneous with Windows, UNIX, and proprietary military operating sys-
tems.
22.3 2 42.0 41.6 Full recovery is expected to occur quickly.
22.5 1 77.5 75.9 Release of patient care information damages the hospital’s reputation.
22.7 3 43.0 45.2 The company uses proprietary languages and tools that are very difficult to exploit.
22.9 2 47.0 48.1 The IT staff are supported by various stable vendor contractors.
24.0 1 75.0 70.6 Release of patient care information violates HIPAA regulations.
24.1 2 77.0 69.9 This involves a classified military network.
24.2 1 66.0 64.9 The back-end servers are unique and housed in a single data center on the hospital premises.
24.4 2 35.0 41.9 The systems running on the network use proprietary military operating systems.
make without contextual information so Study 2 provided
contextual information that Study 1 lacked.
Study 2 was designed to help refine our understanding
of the factors that were identified as important in Study
1. For example, factors relating to the adversary (knowl-
edge/skill/capabilities) were considered highly important
in Study1 and were also associated with higher levels of
network risk.Many of these factors detailing the adversary
formed the adversary/threat dimension in Study 2. Also,
in Study 1, factors detailing the organization were found
to have different levels of importance. Study 2 helped
us refine our understanding of the organizational factors
that were and were not important. Specifically, factors
relating to the organization’s network infrastructure and
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Table 6 Relationship between perceived risk level and agreement (Study 2)
Safe Neutral Risky Totals
Low Agreement (High SD) 17 10 14 41
High Agreement (Low SD) 9 6 26 41
Totals 26 16 40 82
its ability to defend against attacks were relatively more
important than others in Study 1 and were associated
with lower levels of network risk in Study 2. Both studies
had two dimensions in common; threat/adversary and the
organization. The two dimensions discovered in Study 2,
information and personnel skill, were related to the subset
of Study 1 organizational factors that seemed to have high
variability in importance ratings. Hence, whether or not
context was present, our sample of network professionals
believed that dimensions of network risk should include
both organizational network infrastructure (the prepared-
ness for attack) and the threat/adversary (the attack). This
provides some clues about the dimensions of network risk
definitions that network professionals, rather than risk
metric designers, endorse.
The finding that network risk judgments are strongly
influenced by information about the adversary/threat
is important because network certification generally
neglects threat/adversary factors. For example, the NIST
CVSS v2.10 metric focuses mainly on other factors associ-
ated with information, infrastructure, and personnel skill.
One reason why the threat/adversary factors were both
very important and risky to our study participants is that
the existence of unknown, dangerous entities (i.e., the
adversary) which cannot be easily perceived and con-
trolled is anxiety provoking. While the factors we pro-
vided about the adversary were of known qualities (e.g.,
the adversary has excellent cyber offense skills, the adver-
sary is highly motivated), the adversary still poses an
uncomfortable uncertainty in network defense because
one cannot predict when an attack will occur (and by
whom), how the attack will be executed, and what the
adversary wants. Prior research has indicated that peo-
ple are generally uncomfortable with uncertainty and
typically avoid it [25,26], and when uncertainty cannot
be avoided, a fear response is invoked [27]. When fear
increases, perceptions of risk also increase [28-30].
Implications
The importance of our results is that we used research
methods from the social sciences to devise a list of factors
that impact network risk judgments from network pro-
fessionals. This information is important for risk metric
designers who require metric users to subjectively inter-
pret various factors as part of the metric output. Given
little information is published on how certain factors were
chosen for these network risk metrics, it is possible that
these factors were chosen according to the opinions of
the risk metric designer rather than the opinions of net-
work professionals. Factors that our sample agrees are
more important to risk judgments may not be the factors
the metric designer includes; which we detail in the sub-
sequent paragraph. We make the argument herein that
network risk is difficult for one person to accurately judge
given the technical knowledge diversity required. There-
fore, consensus on factors important to risk judgments
from a sample of network professionals may inform risk
metric designers. In addition, future research on net-
work risk perception and judgment can build upon our
findings.
The factors our sample agreed were risky and impor-
tant to network risk judgments were not necessarily fac-
tors included in computed risk models like the NIST
CVSS V2.10. For example, the CVSS V2.10 includes
factors describing organizational and network readiness
rather than the adversarial capabilities. While it could
be argued that the NIST CVSS V2.10 metric assess vul-
nerabilities, the metric is being used for security risk
management (http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide). Our
research identified drivers for high network risk levels that
are missing or not well articulated in this NIST metric:
From Study 1, “the adversary’s knowledge about the orga-
nization’s deployed network and security technology” and
“the adversary’s level of skill (professional vs. amateur)”.
The importance of these missing factors was confirmed in
Study 2 when participants rated the adversary’s skill and
training as factors that greatly increase network risk levels.
Other missing factors that we identified as contributing
to risk perception were perceived adversarial motivation,
success rate of the adversary exploitation in recent history,
and the importance of the targeted data to be exploited.
Factors that reliably increase or decrease perceived risk
are likely to be important for an accurate computed risk
model.
Limitations and future directions
A few limitations are worth mentioning that may have
impacted our results. First, the target population in these
two studies was difficult to persuade to participate in
our studies. Network professionals familiar with adversar-
ial techniques used to penetrate a network, may mistake
the emailed survey links for a phishing campaign. There-
fore, sampling was challenging, which was reflected in
our low sample sizes and consequently, we were limited
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Table 7 Emergent network risk dimensions and associated factors (Study 2)
Factor Mean risk SD Risk group
INFORMATION DIMENSION: Features related to the information stored on the network, the adversaries who want
that information, and the consequences of the information being compromised. [Vignette #1: Hospital network]
Recordkeeping could convert back to paper. 40.6 21.8
Hospital is in a metropolitan area. 56.6 16.1
Various adversarial organizations have growing concerns over the lack of medical
record privacy because of the legislation.
63.1 14.3
The hacker’s intent was to motivate another reformation of the national health care
system.
63.1 18.0 SR
All patient records are digitized. 65.0 16.0 SR
It (the network) involves a large hospital. 68.4 17.4 SR
The type of data the hospital handles 68.9 5.9 SR
Release of patient care information violates HIPAA regulations. 71.9 24.1 VR
Hackers in the past few weeks have been attacking various medical centers nation-
wide.
72.4 9.3 VR
These attacks in the past few weeks have leaked private patient care information on
the internet.
74.0 19.2 VR
These adversarial organizations are persistent and academically capable of executing
an attack.
74.3 20.6 VR
A prolonged outage of digital recordkeeping could cause significant damage to the
hospital’s ability to serve its patients.
75.2 18.0 VR
Release of patient care information damages hospital’s reputation. 76.2 22.6
Release of patient care information puts the hospital in legal liability. 79.9 18.0 VR
INFRASTRUCTURE DIMENSION: Features related to the infrastructure of the network and the compliance of the
network with established protocols. [Vignette #1: Hospital network]
Machines are not connected to both the private network and the internet. 24.0 18.5 VS
The hospital recently installed additional emergency electrical generators. 29.6 15.6 VS
The personnel manning facilities are competent. 30.9 17.1 SS
The IT department is adequately staffed. 31.7 17.2 SS
A disaster recovery plan has been implemented. 32.0 18.8 VS
Results of the audit meet or exceed best practices for network configuration and
maintenance.
32.0 19.6 VS
The recovery effort from a natural disaster is expected to be rapid. 32.3 21.2 VS
All digitized records are stored and processed on a private network. 36.0 19.9 SS
IT had a yearly audit due to HIPAA requirements. 36.6 18.5 SS
Database is Linux based for large-scale processing and storage. 44.8 11.1
Records are transferred from one hospital to another manually. 45.3 20.6
These adversarial organizations are not financially well funded. 50.6 10.2
The recent legislation on the reformation of the national health care system 58.2 11.9
Network is connected to programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for the medical
equipment to receive test results and to manage and operate the machines. A PLC is
a digital computer used for automating electromechanical processes.
59.7 17.4
The back-end servers are unique and housed in a single data center on the hospital
premises.
64.9 24.9
PERSONNEL SKILL DIMENSION: Features related to the skill and training of network personnel. [Vignette #2: Military
network]
The network is a self-contained, segregated, and air-gapped network. 26.0 20.8 VS
The IT staff man the network 24/7. 34.6 20.9 VS
The network is in full compliance with the DoD. 35.1 18.4 SS
The IT staff are fully trained. 36.4 20.4 SS
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Table 7 Emergent network risk dimensions and associated factors (Study 2) (Continued)
Factor Mean risk SD Risk group
An audit was recently passed. 36.7 15.9
The IT staff are well trained at various military schools. 39.2 19.3
The military installation has a mature emergency operation plan (EOP) and continuity
of operations plan (COOP) that comply with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) recommendations.
41.0 19.3
Full recovery is expected to occur quickly. 41.6 22.3
The systems running on the network use proprietary military operating systems. 41.9 24.4
The network is within a small geographical region near a war zone. 68.5 20.2 SR
ADVERSARY SKILL DIMENSION: Features related to the skill, resources, andmotivation of the adversary. [Vignette #2:
Military network]
The network has various UNIX systems. 59.6 21.4
The network is heterogeneous with Windows, UNIX, and proprietary military operat-
ing systems.
67.1 22.1 SR
The network has Windows systems. 78.8 16.4 VR
The primary adversary is a nation state. 83.1 16.9 VR
The adversary is deeply interested in U.S. troop positioning. 86.2 14.9 VR
The primary adversary is well funded. 87.5 12.1 VR
The adversary is highly motivated. 87.7 14.8 VR
The adversary was likely trained by the U.S. government in the past two years. 88.8 13.9 VR
Malicious activity has been noted on the network in the past sixmonths sincewartime
operations intensified in this region.
92.2 12.1 VR
The primary adversary has excellent offensive cyber skills equal to or better than 90
existing nation states.
92.6 10.2 VR
in the types of statistical analyses we could conduct. For
example, we wanted to relate the risky/safe ratings for
each factor to the overall network risk rating of each
vignette but the low sample sizes made that impossible.
We also wished to assess group differences (military, pri-
vate industry, government) but again, the sample sizes
encumbered that effort. One way to reduce the time bur-
den for study participation was to only require questions
that were central to the study objective. Consequently, not
all demographics questions were required in both studies,
which resulted in low question response rates that could
never characterize the sample.
Another limitation is that it is unclear whether our find-
ings reflect the judgments of DAA and IA officers. The
process of network certification described in our study
may be of little relevance to the broader sample of individ-
uals involved in network defense. The derived judgments
and perceptions may not align with those of DAA and
IA officers who conduct network certification in the pub-
lic sector, especially military organizations (the relatively
low representation of public sector respondents in Study
2 underscores this limitation). Similarly, construct dimen-
sions derived in our data-driven approach may be a reflec-
tion of the views and experience of the participants in our
study. While it was impractical for our studies to sample
exclusively from personnel responsible for configuring
and certifying networks, future research should include
validation studies to determine if our results are consis-
tent with judgments obtained from individuals directly
responsible for network certification.
In addition, future research should continue to flesh
out which factors are significantly risky and safe in vari-
ous network contexts and why. Our results were intended
to serve as a foundation upon which future research and
operations can be built. For example, network risk metrics
in operations could improve the validity of network risk
metrics by including some of our most agreed upon risky
and safe factors. Researchers could investigate whether
commonly agreed upon dimensions relate to factor per-
ception and definitions of network risk.
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